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The classic description of the ‘sham’ doctrine is found in the following passage from 
Lord Diplock’s judgment in Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd: 
 
But one thing, I think, is clear in legal principle, morality and the authorities 
… that for acts or documents to be a “sham”, with whatever legal 
consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common 
intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and 
obligations which they give the appearance of creating.1 
 
Although a contract law case, the Snook doctrine has long been applied to the law of 
trusts. The allegation that a trust is a sham is typically made when a settlor, desirous 
of avoiding the effects of an insolvency, a large tax bill or a division of assets on 
divorce, purports to divest himself of his assets by settling them upon trust. The trust 
declared is often a discretionary one where the settlor is named as a beneficiary and, 
in practice, he retains a great deal of control over the trust fund. Interested parties 
(usually creditors, the revenue authorities or the settlor’s spouse) may then allege that 
the declaration of trust is no more than a ‘sham’, the ‘truth of the matter’ being that 
the settlor never divested himself of the assets.  
 
 To give an example, take the Australian case of Raftland Pty Ltd v Federal 
Commission of Taxation2 where three brothers controlled the ‘Raftland’ unit trust and 
had turned a substantial (and taxable) profit. They took steps to acquire another unit 
trust, the ‘E & M trust’, which had substantial tax losses. They resolved to make the E 
& M trust a beneficiary of the Raftland unit trust. It was found, however, that the 
brothers had no intention ever to distribute assets to the E & M trust. Their ‘real’ or 
‘true’ intention was not to make E & M a beneficiary of the trust, but to offset the tax 
liabilities of E & M against the taxable profits of the Raftland trust. This was held to 
amount to a sham, with Kirby J stating: 
 
The key to a finding of a sham is the demonstration, by evidence or available 
inference, of a disparity between the transaction evidenced in the 
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documentation (and related conduct of the parties) and the reality disclosed 
elsewhere in the evidence. Where, for example, the evidence shows a 
discordance between the parties’ legal rights or obligations as described in the 
documents and the actual intentions which those parties are shown to have had 
as to their legal rights and obligations, a conclusion of sham will be 
warranted.3 
 
The Raftland case illustrates the difficulties in conceptualising this area of law: in 
what sense did the brothers ‘not intend’ to make E & M a beneficiary of the trust; is it 
the inner ‘subjective’ mental state that is important, or the intention expressed in 
communications; is the court effectively making the settlor’s motives justiciable? 
These questions go to the very heart of the ‘certainty of intention’ requirement in 
trusts. 
 
 
 
A. Two views on Sham Trusts 
 
 
 
How are we to make sense of the decision in Raftland? Despite expressing a clear 
intention in declaring a trust in favour of the E & M unit trust, the court, applying the 
sham doctrine, held that there was no validly declared trust. Broadly speaking, there 
are two views on the operation of the sham doctrine. 
 
First, some argue that sham is not, in itself, a distinct doctrine in the law of 
trusts. It is trite law that express trusts have a‘certainty of intention’ requirement, 
meaning that a settlor must intend the creation of a trust over specific rights. In 
proving a sham, the argument goes, a litigant is doing no more than establishing that 
the certainty of intention requirement has not been met. Jessica Palmer, an advocate 
of this approach, argues: 
 
[S]hams are arrangements whose appearances do not reflect the underlying 
actual intention or purpose of the relevant parties. In tshe trusts context, a trust 
will be a sham where the settlor did not actually intend to create a trust. The 
doctrine of sham trusts is hence an aspect of the law relating to certainty of 
intention required for a valid trust. Where the settlor did not intend to create a 
trust, no trust exists because the required certainty of intention is absent.4 
                                                        
3 [2008] HCA 21, [145]. 
4 J Palmer, ‘Dealing with the Emerging Popularity of Sham Trusts’ [2007] NZLR 81, 92. One of the 
authors of the present piece made a similar argument in the context of sham licenses granted by 
landlords wishing to avoid the protection afforded to the tenant by the grant of a lease. See B 
McFarlane and E Simpson, ‘Tackling Avoidance’, in J Getzler (ed) Rationalising Equity and Trusts 
(LLP, London 2003).  
  
 
To apply this argument to Raftland, the court, in concluding that trust was a sham, 
was simply reaching the conclusion that there was no intention to declare a trust. In 
this sense, whilst sham may describe the motivation of the defendants in the case, it 
adds little to the legal analysis. 
 
 The second, and alternate, view holds that sham is a distinct doctrine, separate 
from the certainty of intention requirement. This was most clearly articulated in the 
New Zealand case of Official Assignee v Wilson.5 In rejecting Palmer’s argument, 
Robertson and O’Reagan JJ stated:  
 
The two situations (valid trust and sham trust) do not fall into combination. 
The finding that a purported trust is void as a sham does not amount to an 
invalidation of a trust. It is not the trust as such which is the sham. There is no 
trust to be a sham. It is the documentation that is the sham.6 
 
The notion that the sham doctrine is distinct from the standard ‘certainty of intention’ 
requirement has been forcefully advocated by Matthew Conaglen. Conaglen has 
argued that the sham doctrine requires a litigant to establish different facts from those 
that are relevant to the standard ‘certainty of intention’ requirement. Specifically, 
when a sham is pleaded the court looks to material outside of the trust deed in order to 
ascertain the subjective intention of the settlor. This is distinct, the argument goes, 
from the normal ‘certainty of intention’ inquiry, where the court looks to the terms of 
the trust deed in order to ascertain the objective intention of the settlor. As Conaglen 
states: 
 
[N]either the subsequent conduct of the parties, nor their subjective intentions, 
are considered when ascertaining what rights and obligations the parties 
intended to create by the trust documents which they signed. The importance 
of this in the context of the sham doctrine is that it is precisely these sorts of 
factors that can be considered in order to determine whether an arrangement is 
a sham.7 
 
There are perhaps two ways in which the sham doctrine, so far as it exists, is distinct 
from the normal ‘certainty of intention’ requirement. The first, according to 
Conaglen, is that it is a subjective inquiry. The certainty of intention inquiry is 
normally considered an objective one, where a court attempts to ascertain what the 
settlor’s words meant, not what he meant by them. If, by pleading sham, a litigant 
must establish the settlor’s subjective state of mind – what he ‘actually’ meant – then 
the inquiry becomes a very different one. Second, the sham doctrine may be distinct 
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at an evidential level, in the sense that it permits the court to consider a wider range of 
material in ascertaining the settlor’s intention. Conaglen alludes to this idea in the 
above quote when he refers to the subsequent conduct of the parties, evidence which 
is often excluded by the parol evidence rule in normal ‘certainty of intention’ inquiry.  
 
 If Conaglen is correct, and sham is a distinct doctrine, separate from the 
certainty of intention requirement, then this may have important consequences for 
how it is pleaded by litigants. For one, it may have a bearing on the burden of proof. 
A party alleging the existence of a trust bears the burden of establishing the settlor’s 
intention. However, if sham is a separate doctrine which requires a litigant to establish 
a separate fact (namely the negative fact that no trust was intended), then it would 
appear that the burden should shift to the party denying the existence of a trust. 
Second, it may have implications for the remedies available. If sham is no more than a 
failure to establish certainty of intention, then no trust ever comes into existence, and 
proprietary rights under a trust are never created. If sham is separate, however, then 
the position may be more complicated. It may be that a trust does come into existence, 
but the sham makes it void or voidable. What then happens to rights purportedly 
created under the trust? Finally, and most importantly, the status of sham determines 
what a litigant must prove in order to establish his case. If sham is a separate doctrine, 
then it follows that a litigant must establish a different set of facts to those which are 
relevant to the ‘certainty of intention’ requirement (otherwise sham and ‘certainty of 
intention’ become conceptually indistinguishable). If sham is a separate doctrine then 
what are these separate facts?  
 
This article will ask whether Conaglen is correct to argue that sham is a 
distinct doctrine, separate from the ‘certainty of intention’ requirement. We will 
consider the two purported features of the doctrine – that it is a subjective inquiry and 
that it permits the admission of parol evidence – in turn. We will also consider a final 
conceptualisation of the doctrine, which is that it is a specialised form of 
‘rectification’.  
 
In conducting this analysis we will argue that Conaglen is wrong to suggest 
that sham is separate from the normal ‘certainty of intention’ doctrine. We accept that 
the normal ‘certainty of intention’ inquiry is an objective one that depends on the 
communicated mental state of the settlor. However, we will argue that when a sham 
has been pleaded in the decided cases, the courts have not, as Conaglen suggests, 
switched to a subjective inquiry. Rather, we will show that courts’ attitude in sham 
cases continues to be an objective one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
B. Sham as a Subjective Inquiry 
 
 
 
The principal claim made by Conaglen is that sham is distinct from the ‘certainty of 
intention’ requirement because the former, unlike the latter, involves a subjective 
inquiry. As he argues:  
 
… the certainty of intention principle generally focuses on the negative fact 
that the court has been unable to identify a clear objective intention to create a 
trust, whereas sham doctrine focuses on the positive finding that the parties 
involved subjectively did not intend to create a trust such as that recorded in 
the sham documents.8 
 
This argument has found support in the case law. In Raftland, for instance, we find 
several references to a search for the ‘real’ or ‘actual’ intention of the settlor, and 
Kirby J, when describing the sham doctrine, states:  
 
The test as to the parties’ intentions is subjective. In essence, the parties must 
have intended to create rights and obligations different from those described in 
their documents.9  
 
In Official Assignee v Wilson Glazebrook J expressly endorsed Conaglen’s views:  
 
In my view, where a sham is alleged, the search is for the subjective intent that 
the transaction is a sham. After all, the whole point of a sham is that it is 
intended to have an effect other than the effect it would have if looked at 
objectively.10 
 
In order to test this conceptualisation of the sham doctrine, two things must be 
established. The first is that the normal ‘certainty of intention’ requirement does, as 
asserted in these quotes, involve an objective inquiry into the settlor’s mental state. 
Second, that when a sham is pleaded, the court switches to a subjective inquiry.  
 
 
1. Do courts construe declarations objectively?  
 
The first question that must be asked is whether Conaglen is correct to say that the 
normal approach to ascertaining a settlor’s intention is an objective one. Before 
answering the question it is first necessary to explain what ‘objectivity’ means in the 
trusts context. Most attempts to define objectivity draw some distinction between the 
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meaning attached to a statement by the speaker, and the meaning conveyed to the 
addressee, or a reasonable person in the addressee’s position.11 The facts of Byrnes v 
Kendle12 provide an illustration. The defendant in the case, using both his own and his 
then wife’s savings, had acquired freehold title to a house. He then executed a trust 
deed, which stated, amongst other things, that he held the title ‘on trust’ for the 
benefit of himself and his then wife. Following his separation from his wife, and her 
assigning her interest to her son (the claimant), a dispute arose as to the payment of 
rent, as the defendant had permitted his own son to live at the premises rent free. If 
there was a trust of the freehold, with the claimant holding a beneficial interest, then it 
was clear that he was entitled to the receipt of rent. The defendant attempted to 
introduce evidence that he believed, in executing the deed, that he was merely 
undertaking to share the sale value of the land should he ever sell it in the future, and 
hence no trust was ever created. The dispute in the case, therefore, was whether the 
‘certainty of intention’ requirement for the establishment of a trust had been satisfied. 
The case illustrates how objective and subjective inquiries can point in different 
directions. A subjective approach– what did Mr Kendle mean by his words ‘on trust’? 
– would result in there being no trust as Mr Kendle meant no more than a promise to 
split the proceeds of sale in the future.  An objective approach – what would the 
reasonable addressee understand the words ‘on trust’ to mean? – would result in a 
trust, those words clearly conveying an intention to settle the title in this way.  
 
The High Court of Australia decided that the latter inquiry, the objective one, 
was appropriate in the trusts context, Heydon and Crennan JJ stating:  
 
... the “intention” referred to is an intention to be extracted from the words 
used, not a subjective intention which may have existed but which cannot be 
extracted from those words. This is as true of unilateral declarations of alleged 
trust as it is of bilateral covenants to create an alleged trust.13 
 
Whilst this appears to make the position in Australian law clear, the issue is a 
controverted one. The High Court was strongly influenced by the position in contract 
law, where it is well established that a court should objectively construe the terms of a 
contract.14 Yet some may be reluctant to push the analogy with contract too far. 
Trusts, it must be noted, are often unilateral, in the sense that their creation depends 
entirely on the settlor’s exercise of his power to create a trust. The resulting focus on 
the settlor’s intention, to the exclusion of any other party such as the trustee or 
beneficiary, may lead some to favour a subjective approach. This tendency may be 
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particularly strong where the settlor is acting gratuitously: if Mr Kendle, for instance, 
was under no obligation to divest himself of the value of his title, then why should he 
be bound by a construction that he never intended? There is an obvious temptation to 
favour a subjective approach in the context of trusts law. This is perhaps encouraged, 
as Heydon and Crennan JJ note, by the ‘… constant repetition of the need to search 
for an “intention to create a trust”…’.15 Indeed, the conclusions of the High Court are 
undermined somewhat by the suggestion that Mr Kendle should be able to plead 
‘rectification’ so as to bring the declaration of trust into line with his subjective state 
of mind.16 This potential contradiction is considered further in the final part of this 
paper. 
 
There is some evidence of a subjective approach to interpretation in trusts law. 
The best example is the problematic Australian case of Commissioner of Stamp 
Duties (QD) v Jollife.17 Under a statute it was illegal for an account holder to hold a 
second account at a bank, except where the second account is held on trust for 
another. The defendant, already holding an account, deposited money in a second 
account and made a declaration to the bank that he held it on trust for his sisters.  The 
defendant subsequently denied the existence of a trust. His argument succeeded as the 
court permitted him to introduce evidence that, notwithstanding his declaration of 
trust, his real intention was to retain title to the fund and earn interest on it. As this 
intention was never disclosed (until the legal proceedings), it could only be 
ascertained by conducting a subjective inquiry into the defendant’s mental state; an 
objective inquiry – what meaning did the defendant convey to a reasonable person in 
the position of the bank? – would yield nothing other than an intention to create a 
trust as that is all that was communicated.  
 
 It is sometimes asked whether Joliffe, which has now been overruled in 
Australia by Byrnes v Kendle, ever represented the legal position in England. Lewin 
on Trusts, 18 in citing the case in successive editions, appeared to support the view 
that Joliffe is correct in English law, and one can certainly find some support for it in 
the old case law. In the nineteenth century case of Field v Lonsdale19, which involved 
facts almost identical to those found in Joliffe, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Langdale, 
refused to give effect to the obvious (objective) meaning of the defendant’s 
declaration of trust over the second bank account:  
 
… the only intention was to evade the provisions of the Act of Parliament 
[prohibiting a second account], and not to create a trust. The declaration is, 
therefore, ineffectual, and the claim must be dismissed.20 
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Yet Joliffe, and similar cases like Field v Lonsdale, despite never being expressly 
rejected in the English courts, are clearly inconsistent with principles developed in 
relation to the certainty of intention requirement. Specifically, the cases do not square 
with the traditional exclusion of evidence of an undisclosed or secret intention. It is 
not mental states per se which constitute trusts, but the communication of them. 
Indeed, this was pointed out in Joliffe in the strong dissenting judgment of Isaacs J:  
 
It is just as improper morally to permit a man who has openly undertaken such 
a trust to escape his conscientious obligation by reason merely of a secret 
mental reservation not to fulfil what he has openly undertaken. An open 
declaration of trust is therefore an expression of intention that is final and 
beyond recall.21 
 
Trusts may be unilateral, in the sense of depending solely on the settlor’s decision to 
exercise his power to create a trust, but they also impose duties on some and create 
rights for others. The consequences of the creation of a trust for persons other than the 
settlor make it entirely reasonable for the law to insist on some act of communication. 
This is evident from the need for a ‘declaration’ in order to establish an express 
trust.22 To ‘declare’ a trust a settlor must ‘manifest’23, or communicate, his intention 
to another. This was emphasised by French CJ in Byrnes v Kendle where he said: ‘… 
the relevant intention in such a case is that manifested by a declaration of trust.’24  
Secret intentions do not pass this threshold and, hence, are irrelevant to the question 
of whether or not a trust has been constituted. As Megarry J said in Re Vandervell, 
‘To yearn is not to transfer.’25 
 
 What we have established so far is that a basic requirement for the creation of 
an express trust is the communication of intention by the settlor. We may now ask 
how these acts of communication are interpreted by the courts: do courts attempt to 
ascertain what the settlor meant by his words, or do they ask what a reasonable person 
would understand those words to mean? Whilst the law of trusts does not have the 
same body of case law on this issue as that found in contract law, there is more than 
enough evidence to show that the courts ask the latter question, i.e. the inquiry is an 
objective one.  
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 Perhaps the leading case on this issue is the House of Lords decision in 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Raphael.26 A testator had left money to his son 
on the condition that the son settle it on a trust with specific terms. The son attempted 
to follow his father’s instructions. However, the wording he used when settling the 
trust was clearly incompatible with the conditions set out in the will and, 
consequently, the gift failed.  The son attempted to save the gift by arguing that the 
terms of the trust that he had settled should be interpreted subjectively, so that the 
words carried the meaning he had hoped for, namely a meaning consistent with the 
conditions set out in the will. Rejecting the argument, Lord Wright said: ‘It must be 
remembered at the outset that the court, while it seeks to give effect to the intention of 
the parties, must give effect to that as expressed, that is, it must ascertain the meaning 
of the words actually used.’27 What the son desired the words to mean, therefore, was 
wholly irrelevant.  
 
 
2. Who is the reasonable addressee? 
 
Although these cases may make the objective approach secure in English law, we 
must still consider the specific form of objectivity that is applied. We have seen that 
an objective approach inquires into what meaning was reasonably conveyed by the 
settlor’s words. The difficulty in asking this question, however, is that a settlor’s 
words can reasonably convey different meanings to different persons. Take the 
nineteenth century charitable trust case of Shore v Wilson28 where a testatrix left a 
sum of money on trust for ‘poor and Godly preachers of Christ’s holy gospel.’ To a 
detached observer, who shares the testatrix’s language, but little else, the words can 
reasonably be understood to mean that any person of the Christian faith is a potential 
beneficiary. However, to the persons to whom the will was addressed (the trustees), 
who were aware that the testatrix was a strict Calvinist, the words could reasonably be 
understood to refer to a much narrower group of people, namely those belonging to 
the non-conformist group. Tindal CJ, in a much cited speech, said that evidence could 
be introduced to show that ‘… besides their general common meaning, [the words] 
have acquired, by custom or otherwise, a well-known peculiar idiomatic meaning … 
in the particular society of which [the testatrix was] former a member …’29For Tindal 
CJ, the important question is what meaning was conveyed to a reasonable person in 
the position of the trustees. 
 
 Declarations of trust are acts of communication that, if successful in creating a 
trust, must instantiate a legal relationship between the settlor, trustee (if a different 
person) and beneficiary. Let us say that a purported settlor, alone in his living room, 
says ‘I declare myself trustee …’. Aside from the difficulties of proving this, it is 
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unlikely, as a matter of law, that this can constitute a trust. The settlor’s intention 
must, at some point, be communicated to the relevant parties, namely the trustee and 
beneficiary. As declarations of trust are acts of communication addressed to specific 
persons, then it logically follows that the court, when interpreting the declaration, 
should ask what meaning is conveyed to the addressee (i.e. the trustee or beneficiary). 
This is sometimes referred to as ‘promisee objectivity’, or ‘addressee objectivity’.30 
The difficulty that can arise is that a settlor may have different addressees in mind 
when he makes a declaration. His words could be directed towards to the putative 
trustee or beneficiary; or he may have some third party, such as the court, his 
creditors, or the revenue authorities, at the front of his mind when he makes a 
declaration of trust. Given that a settlor’s words can convey different meanings to 
different persons, which perspective does the court adopt for the purposes of 
construction?  
 
It is not clear if this question has been explicitly addressed in the trusts 
context.31 Some guidance may be found in the doctrine of secret trusts. Such trusts 
arise where a testator is desirous of settling some of his estate on trust for a particular 
beneficiary on his death, but does not wish to disclose this in his will.32 Instead, the 
testator purports to make a gift in his will to a donee, but privately communicates to 
the donee that he is to take it upon trust for the beneficiary. To a detached observer, 
who sees nothing but the will, the transaction has the desired effect of looking like an 
outright gift to the donee; but to the donee, who is privy to other private 
communications, a very different meaning is communicated. Secret trusts are similar 
to sham trusts, in the sense that the settlor deliberately conveys different message to 
different persons. What courts have long held in the context of secret trusts is that it is 
the testator’s intention as conveyed to the donee that counts, not the impression given 
to the detached observer who just sees the will. Sham trusts, as we will see, follow 
this pattern. When a sham is pleaded, courts consider what meaning is conveyed by 
the settlor to the putative trustee or beneficiary, not a detached observer.  
 
 
3. Are ‘sham trusts’ construed subjectively? 
 
The first premise of Conaglen’s argument, that courts adopt an objective approach 
when construing a declaration of trust, is correct. We must now ask whether the sham 
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doctrine operates differently by conducting a subjective inquiry. The evidence for 
this, as we will see, is rather thin. 
 
Let us begin by considering cases where the sham allegation has succeeded, 
leading to the conclusion that there is no trust. In Raftland Pty Ltd v Federal 
Commission of Taxation, a case discussed at the beginning of this chapter, three 
brothers who owned the Raftland unit trust executed a trust deed which declared that 
another unit trust, the E & M trust, was a beneficiary under the Raftland trust. 
However, the owners of the E & M trust, who were paid some $250k by the three 
brothers, were led to the clear understanding that they would receive no further 
payments as beneficiaries once the trust had been declared. The parties had a clear 
agreement, therefore, that, notwithstanding the declaration of trust, the E & M trust 
was not entitled to a beneficial interest in the Raftland trust. In holding the declaration 
of trust to be a sham, the court was of the view that it was giving effect to the 
subjective intention of the parties. This view seems to be based on the idea that the 
‘objective intention’ was encoded in the written declaration of trust and, and, in 
looking at the ‘reality’ behind the declaration, the court’s approach had become a 
subjective one. As Kirby J said: ‘In other words, where it is legally warranted, sham 
analysis affords the court a ground for ignoring, instead of merely construing, the 
primary documentary material in determining the rights and obligations of the 
parties.’33 
 
In ignoring the written declaration of trust, was the court giving effect to the 
subjective intention of the parties? We would suggest that it was not. It is important to 
recall that when it conducts an objective inquiry the court does not adopt a detached 
perspective, and ask what the settlor’s words mean to a distant observer. Rather, it 
puts itself in the position of the person to whom the words were addressed, which, in 
the case of Raftland, would be the purported beneficiary, the E & M unit trust. The 
crucial point is that the owners of the E & M unit trust were privy to two separate 
communications: first, the written declaration of trust, which conveys a clear intention 
to make the E & M unit trust a beneficiary; second, private oral statements that 
conveyed precisely the opposite intention, that the ‘declaration’ was to have no legal 
effect and they would not be beneficiaries. A person in the position of the E & M unit 
trust would reasonably understand that three brothers had no intention to make the E 
& M unit trust a beneficiary under the Raftland trust. The outcome in the case is 
perfectly explicable under normal principles of objective construction. 
 
A similar case where the sham allegation succeeded is that of Midland Bank v 
Wyatt34 where the defendant, worried about his business failing, purported to declare 
title to his land upon trust for his wife and his daughter. His wife signed the 
declaration, after which the defendant put the document in his safe, and continued to 
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deal with the freehold title. The court held that the declaration was a sham. Crucial to 
this finding was the wife’s evidence that when she signed the declaration she had no 
idea what she was putting her name to, and was not aware of the ‘import or effect’ of 
the document.35 Whilst an intent to declare a trust may be readily inferred by a third 
party who merely reads the trust deed, the defendant had deliberately ensured that no 
such intention was communicated to his wife, the purported beneficiary. As the court 
stated, the wife knew ‘nothing about’ the trust.36 An objective approach, which asks 
what meaning was conveyed to the defendant’s wife, yields nothing, as there was no 
communication of the intention to create a trust. It was this lack of communication, 
not the defendant’s subjective mental state, that led the court to conclude that there 
was a sham.  
 
 The strongest evidence that courts do not switch to a subjective approach 
when sham is pleaded can be found in cases where the allegation has not been proved. 
The leading English case is Shalson v Russo37 where the defendant, who was the sole 
beneficiary of a trust worth approximately £39m, instructed the trust company to 
resettle the trust fund on a discretionary trust for the defendant and his family. The 
claimant argued that this was a sham, as the defendant was implicated in a number of 
fraudulent schemes and had resettled the trust so as to protect himself from potential 
claims. Rimer J held that even though the defendant may not have had the intention to 
divest himself of his equitable interest, he never disclosed this to the trustee and, 
hence, it was something that the law could not take cognisance of. Rimer J said:  
 
The settlor may have an unspoken intention that the assets are in fact to be 
treated as his own and that the trustee will accede to his every request on 
demand. But unless that intention is from the outset shared by the trustee (or 
later becomes shared), I fail to see how the settlement can be regarded as a 
sham.38 
 
So far as the defendant in the case had an intention to retain his assets under the trust, 
this was never communicated to the trustee or any other party and, hence, could only 
be disclosed by a subjective inquiry. Consequently, the allegation that the trust was a 
sham failed. 
 
The irrelevance of uncommunicated mental states is further supported by the 
case of In re Esteem’s Settlement.39 The defendant, a former director of the claimant 
company, had defrauded the company of several million dollars and had settled part 
of this sum on a trust. As in Shalson v Russo, it was strongly suspected that the 
defendant had no intention of parting with his ownership of the money, but this was 
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not communicated to the trustee, who had been instructed to hold the trust funds in 
the normal way. Again, the court held that an uncommunicated intention, which can 
only be disclosed by a subjective inquiry, could have no legal effect. Birt DB gave the 
following example of the absurd results that would follow if secret mental states could 
determine the rights created:    
 
Let us suppose a case in which A executes a formal deed of gift of his car to B 
but, unknown to B, secretly intends that he should really only lend the car to B 
so that he retains the beneficial interest in the car. The car is delivered to B 
who then treats it as his own for many years. A continues to say nothing of his 
secret intention.40 
 
Just as it would be wrong for A to insist that the car remained his in this example, the 
defendant’s secret intention in re Esteem to retain his assets could not prevent the 
creation of a trust. Most would agree with this as a statement of principle, and the 
example illustrates why courts should not start to conduct subjective inquiries merely 
because a litigant has pleaded sham in a particular case.   
 
 Critics of this approach may attempt to explain the outcome in these cases on 
different grounds. Palmer, for instance, tries to explain the inability of a settlor to lead 
evidence of an uncommunicated intention to retain assets on the basis of an estoppel:  
 
… the trustee may rely on estoppel principles to prevent the settlor from acting 
unconscionably because he or she has led the trustee to believe that the trust 
was valid and genuine and cannot therefore rely on its invalidity against the 
trustee.41 
 
Palmer’s point is that the settlor, having deliberately given the impression of an 
intention to create a trust, cannot then lead evidence of an entirely different mental 
state. However, whilst estoppel may explain why the settlor is precluded from 
pleading evidence of an uncommunicated intention to sham, it would not explain why 
a third party, such as the creditors in Shalson v Russo and In re Esteem’s Settlement, 
were prevented from doing so. The only explanation for this is that uncommunicated 
mental states are fundamentally irrelevant given that intention is assessed objectively. 
 
 A second explanation for the outcome in these cases, advocated by Conaglen, 
is that allegations of sham require a litigant to show that the ‘shamming intention’ 
was common to both the settlor and trustee. The requirement for a common intention 
is mentioned in the classic Snook definition, where, it will be recalled, Lord Diplock 
said: 
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… all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or 
documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give 
the appearance of creating …42 
 
For Conaglen, the outcome in Shalson v Russo and In re Esteem’s Settlement makes 
sense as the requirement that ‘… all parties to the sham must have … an intention to 
mislead …’43 was not met in either case.  
 
The view that there must be a ‘common intention’ to sham has support in the 
case law. In A v A, for instance, Munby J said: 
 
… a trust will not be a sham – in my judgment cannot as a matter of law be a 
sham – if either (i) the original trustee(s), or (ii) the current trustee(s), were 
not, because they lacked the relevant knowledge and intention, party to the 
sham at the time of their appointment.44 
 
Conaglen, we would suggest, is correct to say that an allegation of sham will not be 
made out unless it can be shown that the settlor and trustee have a ‘common intention’ 
to sham. Yet, it is our view that this does not support Conaglen’s overall thesis that 
the sham inquiry is a subjective one. Rather, the need to show a common intention 
supports precisely the opposite view, namely that the court is conducting an objective 
inquiry. The reason for this is that a ‘shamming intent’ can only be common to both 
the settlor and trustee if the former has communicated it to the latter. In the absence of 
a common intention, where the settlor has not disclosed his wish to retain his assets to 
the trustee, an allegation of sham will fail because it would hang entirely upon the 
settlor’s subjective state of mind.   
 
To conclude this section, just because a court is looking behind the written 
declaration of trust does not mean that it is adopting a subjective approach. As we 
have seen, the objective approach employed in trusts law requires the court to ask 
what the settlor’s words meant to a reasonable person in the position of the 
addressee. Such a person in sham cases (usually the trustee, but sometimes a 
beneficiary) is privy not just to the ‘declaration of trust’, but to other communications 
which inform the ‘trustee’ of the settlor’s desire to keep hold of his assets. To ask – 
what would a reasonable person in the position of the ‘trustee’ have understood the 
settlor to mean? – therefore, naturally forces the court to ‘look behind’ the declaration 
of trust as the trustee was privy to other communications.  
 
 
 
C. Sham as a Rule of Evidence  
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So far we have seen that the sham doctrine is indistinguishable from the standard 
‘certainty of intention’ requirement in the sense that both involve an objective inquiry 
into the settlor’s mental state. We will now ask whether sham is distinctive in a 
different sense, namely as an evidential rule. Specifically, we will ask whether the 
sham doctrine consists of an exception to the rule that parol evidence is normally 
excluded when a settlor has executed a declaration of trust. In the Raftland case there 
are several statements that suggest that this is what the ‘sham doctrine’ permits a 
court to do. Kirby J noted that under the ordinary ‘certainty of intention’ requirement, 
‘… courts will ordinarily give legal effect to documents according to their language, 
[but] sham analysis is an exception to that conventional approach.’45 The suggestion 
here is that when sham is pleaded the court is permitted to look behind the written 
declaration, something which it is not normally able to do, when ascertaining the 
intention of the parties. So whilst the inquiry may remain, fundamentally, an objective 
one, sham permits the court to consider a wider range of material when ascertaining 
the intention of the settlor.  
 
 The strongest suggestion that this is the role of the ‘sham doctrine’ comes 
from the Candian case of Antle v R.46 The husband in the case, in an attempt to avoid 
capital gains tax, purported to transfer his shares in a company to a trustee on trust for 
his wife; his wife then purported to sell the shares and make a loan of the proceeds 
back to her husband. Whilst written documents were executed recording each stage of 
the ‘transaction’, in fact the shares were never transferred to a trustee, and no money 
was ever paid to the husband. The husband, citing the parol evidence rule, attempted 
to argue that the court was only able to consider the written documentation, and was 
not permitted to look at other factors, when construing his intention. In rejecting the 
argument, the court was in effect rejecting the application of the parol evidence rule to 
the case, with Noel JA stating:  
 
It would be a surprising result if courts were bound by the formal expression 
of the parties and could not look to the surrounding circumstances, including 
the conduct of the parties, in ascertaining whether the intent to settle a trust is 
present.47 
 
In looking behind the declaration of trust at other factors, the court came to the view 
that there was a clear sham and no trust had been validly declared. What this suggests 
is that the ‘sham doctrine’ may be understood as an exception to the rule that courts 
are usually prohibited from looking at parol evidence where parties have committed 
their declaration of trust to a written document. 
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In order to test this version of the ‘sham doctrine’ we must first say something 
about the parol evidence rule and the significance of a settlor committing his intention 
to declare a trust to writing.48 Whilst there is no legal requirement for a settlor to do 
this, should he decide to, then the normal inference to be drawn is that the settlor has 
intended the trust to be constituted according to the terms expressed in the writing. 
This is best illustrated by the leading case on parol evidence in the context of trusts, 
Rabin v Gerson, 49  where the claimant, after seeking an opinion from counsel, 
expressed the wish to advance money to a Jewish educational association upon a 
charitable trust. However, the trust deed subsequently drafted by the counsel and 
executed by the claimant did not properly reflect this, and the words used in the deed 
were held to mean that there was an absolute transfer to the association. The claimant 
wished to introduce into court the opinion that they had received from counsel in 
order to demonstrate that their intention had been to transfer the money upon trust. 
Rejecting the argument, Fox LJ said: ‘Such evidence, I think, is simply parol evidence 
of the intention of the grantor … The result, in my view, is that the opinions cannot be 
referred to generally for the assistance that their contents may give.’50 It is worth 
pausing to consider this. Given that the claimant, prior to the execution of the deed, 
may well have expressed an intention to transfer funds on trust rather than absolutely, 
and given that the counsel’s opinion may be evidence of this, why would the court 
exclude it when it conducts the certainty of intention inquiry? The trust deed was not 
a formal requirement, in that there was no need to execute it in order to constitute the 
trust. Why then, in searching for the settlor’s intention, are we not permitted to 
consider, in addition to the trust deed, prior communications or statements that shed 
light on the settlor’s intention? The answer to this is that the claimant, in executing 
the trust deed, clearly intended the transfer to take effect on the terms contained in the 
deed. This is what Fox LJ alluded to when he described the opinion as ‘parol 
evidence’.  
 
Although a trust deed may not be a formal requirement in most cases, when a 
settlor executes one, the normal inference is that the settlor intends to be bound by the 
terms of the deed and, consequently, previous expressions of intention are substituted 
by the written terms. We would not be giving effect to the settlor’s intention, 
therefore, if we were to look behind the trust deed to other communications.51 By 
contrast, where a settlor has not intended the trust to take effect on the terms 
contained in the trust deed, then there is logically no reason why extrinsic evidence of 
other communications cannot be admitted in order to ascertain his intention.52 This 
was made clear in Hawke v Edwards53 where Jordan J, discussing the parol evidence 
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rule in the context of contract law, made clear that it has no application to cases 
outside of its logic: 
 
When two persons enter a contract, they may constitute it in writing … or they 
may, in the course of entering into the contract which is not constituted by 
writing, bring into existence writing which relates to it but is not intended by 
them to constitute it. In the latter type of case, although the writing, if relevant, 
may be given in evidence, its existence does not preclude the reception of oral 
evidence of the terms of the contract … To make [the parol evidence] rule of 
exclusion operative, it is necessary that it should be intended by the parties 
that the written document should be a complete record of their bargain.54 
 
Under this conception of the parol evidence rule, the rule is not a technical one of 
evidence, but is just a way of giving effect to the intention of the parties. As such, 
there is a logically prior question of whether the document is genuinely intended to be 
the sole source of obligations. Where parties have intended their transaction to take 
effect according to the written terms, then a court would be ignoring their intention if 
it were to look behind the document at other facts. However, where the parties have 
not so intended, there is no reason why the court is not permitted, in attempting to 
ascertain the relevant intention, to look at evidence other than the document. 
 
 This conceptualisation of the ‘parol evidence’ rule explains why it can have no 
application in cases where a sham is alleged. The essence of the sham allegation is 
precisely that the settlor did not intend to be bound by the terms of the trust deed that 
he executed. In Antle v R,55 although the settlor wished to give the impression of 
settling a trust, his intention, objectively assessed, clearly showed that he did not wish 
to arrange his affairs according to the written declaration. The parol evidence rule can 
have no application to the facts of the case because it is outside of the logic of the 
rule. Sham is not, therefore, an exception to the parol evidence rule, but simply a case 
where the rule can have no application. 
 
 
 
D. Sham as a form of rectification 
 
 
 
The final question we will ask is whether sham can be explained on the same basis as 
the doctrine of rectification. Just as ‘sham trusts’ are said to be an exception to the 
basic principles for ascertaining the settlor’s intention to create a trust, so too is the 
doctrine of rectification. An interesting question, that may shed some light on both 
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doctrines, is whether the facts of a sham case could be pleaded as a claim for 
rectification. 
 
In Allnutt v Wilding Mummery LJ explained that the process of rectifying a 
trust deed ‘… involves bringing the trust document into line with the true intentions 
of the settlor as held by him at the date when he executed the document.’56 The 
remedy is available, he continued, when ‘… owing to a mistake in the drafting of the 
document, it fails to record the settlor’s true intentions.’ To give an example, take the 
case of Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd57 where a company, about to go bankrupt, told 
its solicitor that it desired to protect customers paying funds into their customer 
account by declaring a trust over the account. However, when the trust deed was 
drafted by the solicitor, the wrong account number, which referred to an empty 
account, was recorded. This mistake in the recording of the settlor’s intention needed 
to be remedied by rectifying the document so as to make it reflect the settlor’s prior 
communication.  
 
The conceptual similarity between rectification and sham becomes clear when 
one sees that rectification is commonly thought of as a subjective process. The 
objective approach to interpretation of a settlor’s mental state can lead to results that 
are sometimes seen as unfair. Take Byrnes v Kendle, where the defendant, in 
declaring his freehold title on trust, argued that he meant no more than a promise to 
share the proceeds of the sale of the land should he ever sell it. Given that the 
transaction was purely voluntary, it may seem unfair to hold him to the effect of his 
words if that effect was never desired by him. Perhaps to mitigate the asperity of this 
objective approach, it was suggested that a rectification claim could be brought, so as 
to bring the deed into line with Mr Kendle’s subjective intentions.58 The clearest 
endorsement of this view of rectification comes from the recent case of Day v Day.59 
A mother, who had a freehold title to land, instructed a solicitor to draft a deed which 
would make her son, the defendant, a joint tenant of the legal estate. The solicitor, 
probably acting under the influence of the defendant, went beyond these instructions 
and also included a declaration of trust in the deed, with the son as a beneficiary. The 
court rectified the deed, with the reference to the trust in favour of the son being 
expunged, and being replaced with a trust for the benefit of the mother. Etherton LJ 
said: 
 
What is relevant in such a case is the subjective intention of the settlor. It is 
not a legal requirement for rectification of a voluntary settlement that there be 
an outward expression or objective communication of the settlor’s intention 
…60 
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This view has also found favour amongst some academics. Paul Davies, for instance, 
writes: ‘It is entirely appropriate that rectification should operate as a subjective 
‘safety-valve’ from the objectivity of the common law rules of interpretation. This is 
how equity can complement the common law.’61 
 
 This ‘subjective’ view of rectification shares an obvious similarity with the 
‘sham trust’ cases: in both cases the settlor has said one thing but has meant another. 
Take the case of Joliffe where, it will be recalled, the settlor declared a trust over a 
second bank account in favour of his sister. He successfully argued that his real 
(uncommunicated) intention was to retain his rights in the account absolutely, and the 
declaration was no more than a ploy to avoid a rule against holding more than one 
account at the bank. The facts in the case are an example of a divergence between 
what was said and what was meant. If rectification has the purpose of bringing written 
documents into line with the settlor’s subjective state of mind, could Mr Joliffe have 
structured his claim as one for rectification? 
 
 One objection to such a move would be to focus on Mr Joliffe’s motive in 
misstating his intention. In the normal rectification case the difference between the 
expressed meaning and the subjective state of mind of the settlor is the result of a 
mistake, as the settlor chooses the wrong words to encode his thoughts. By contrast, 
in Joliffe the difference between what was said and what was meant was entirely 
deliberate, as Mr Joliffe’s purpose was to deceive third parties. Should this make a 
difference? This depends on who brings the claim for rectification. If it was Mr Joliffe 
who argued that his written declaration should be brought into line with his secret 
‘real’ intention, then a bar to rectification may come into play. Mr Joliffe, in 
attempting to give the impression to third parties of a trust, but promising himself that 
he retained the fund, was trying to have his cake and eat it, and the courts would 
rightly be reluctant to assist him in so doing. However, if it is a third party who brings 
the rectification claim, should it make a difference that it is a case of deception rather 
than mistake? We would suggest that it should not. Let us say that it is the revenue, 
for instance, who is arguing that Mr Joliffe’s trust deed should be rectified (and hence 
that he should be taxed on the basis that he owns the account absolutely). Could Mr 
Joliffe object to this claim for rectification by saying, ‘Aha, the misleading impression 
I gave in the trust deed was not the result of mistake, but was deliberate!’. Such an 
objection would make little sense. Indeed, a deliberate misstating of intention should 
ground a stronger case for rectification than a mistaken one. 
 
 This discussion of Joliffe is entirely hypothetical as the claim was not pleaded 
as one for rectification. However, if the purpose of rectification is to bring the written 
declaration into line with the settlor’s ‘real’ intention, then we can see no reason why 
a rectification claim would not succeed on the facts of Joliffe. This is a rather startling 
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conclusion, and it highlights a fundamental problem with the subjective view of 
rectification. It may be recalled that earlier in this article it was argued that the 
decision in Joliffe does not represent English law. The English law of trusts is clear in 
stating that an uncommunicated mental state, that can only be disclosed by conducting 
a subjective inquiry, is legally irrelevant. As such, were Joliffe decided today in an 
English court, the court would give effect to Mr Joliffe’s communicated intention and 
ignore his secret one. However, if the court could easily reach the opposite 
conclusion, and give effect to Mr Joliffe’s secret intention to retain the bank account, 
merely by treating it as a claim for rectification, then the jurisdiction to rectify would 
seriously undermine the law’s objective approach to interpretation. It is to be 
questioned whether the law can tolerate such a contradiction in its doctrines.  
 
 This article is not the place to develop arguments concerning rectification. Yet 
it is worth noting that there is another conception of the doctrine that would not lead 
to the strange results discussed in the last paragraph. Professor Stevens has recently 
argued that rectification does not involve a subjective inquiry, but is better understood 
as an exception to the parol evidence rule. To explain this, let us say that a settlor 
orally states to a trustee that he wishes to create a trust on terms xyz, and then 
executes a trust deed which contains terms abc. If the settlor has intended the trust to 
take effect on the terms communicated in the trust deed, then we are prohibited, by 
the parol evidence rule, from considering his earlier communication when 
ascertaining his intention. What rectification does, as Stevens explains, is to rescind 
the settlor’s intention to be bound by the terms contained in the document; the error in 
the recording of the settlor’s intention in the document allows the court to ignore the 
settlor’s wish that the trust take effect subject to those written terms only. 62  The 
consequence of this is that, in the example, when attempting to ascertain the settlor’s 
intention, the court is not confined to examining the words contained in the deed 
(which point to terms abc), but can also examine the earlier oral communication 
(which points to terms xyz). The important point is that it does not follow, from this 
description of rectification, that the court must switch from an objective inquiry to a 
subjective one. If rectification merely permits the court, when conducting the 
‘certainty of intention’ inquiry, to look at communications of intention prior to those 
contained in the trust deed, then there is no reason why it should not construe those 
earlier communications in the normal objective way. This conception of rectification 
would have been of no assistance to Mr Joliffe as there were no earlier 
communications in the case: Mr Joliffe’s ‘shamming’ intention was never disclosed. 
 
 This objective view of rectification is conceptually similar to the type of 
allegation made when a sham is pleaded. The crucial feature of rectification under 
Stevens’ account is that it is an exception to the parol evidence rule, and hence it 
permits a court to consider the settlor’s earlier oral communications. When a sham is 
pleaded, the essence of the allegation is that the parol evidence rule should not apply 
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in the first place as the settlor does not intend to be bound by any words contained in 
the trust deed. To put it a little differently, there is no room for the doctrine of 
rectification to apply in sham cases as the court is already permitted to consider parol 
communications. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
The principal conclusion in this piece is that sham is not a separate doctrine within the 
law of trusts. If we begin with a clear understanding of the operation of the parol 
evidence rule, and how it interacts with the rules for ascertaining a settlor’s intention, 
then we see there is no need to explain ‘sham trusts’ under a separate principle. The 
main allegation made when sham is pleaded is that the settlor did not intend the trust 
to take effect on the terms set out in the trust deed. As we have seen, if this is 
established, then it simply means that a court is not confined to looking at the written 
document when ascertaining the settlor’s intention, but can look to other oral 
communications (which may disclose the ‘shamming intention’). Its attitude towards 
those oral communications continues to be an objective one in that the court asks 
what meaning is reasonably conveyed to the addressee. If a settlor has privately 
communicated to a trustee that, notwithstanding the ‘declaration’, no trust is in fact 
intended, then the normal objective inquiry can give effect to this. 
 
